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INTERNATIONAL CRIMES WITHIN THE
WHITE HOUSE
Jordan J. Paust*
During his so-called long “war” on “terror,” President George
W. Bush has authorized and ordered violations of customary and
treaty-based international law concerning the detention, transfer,
and interrogation of numerous individuals.  For example, in a Feb-
ruary 7, 2002 memorandum, President Bush expressly authorized
the denial of absolute rights and protections contained in the 1949
Geneva Conventions that apply to any person who is detained dur-
ing an armed conflict.1  The President’s memo denied rights and
protections under Geneva law by ordering that humane treatment
be provided merely “in a manner consistent with the principles of
Geneva” and then only “to the extent appropriate and consistent
with military necessity,”2 despite the fact that: (1) far more than the
“principles” of Geneva law apply, (2) it is not “appropriate” to deny
treatment required by Geneva law, and (3) it is well-understood
that alleged military necessity does not justify the denial of treat-
ment required by Geneva law.3  Necessarily, the President’s memo-
randum of February 7, 2002, authorized and ordered the denial of
treatment required by the Geneva Conventions and, therefore,
necessarily authorized and ordered violations of the Geneva Con-
ventions, which are war crimes.
With respect to members of al Qaeda in particular, the White
House announced at that time that members of al Qaeda “are not
* Mike and Teresa Baker Law Center Professor, University of Houston.  Professor
Paust has chaired the International Law Section of the Association of American Law
Schools and the Committee on International Law and the Use of Force of the ABA.
He has also served on the President’s Committee and the Executive Council of the
American Society of International Law (ASIL) and is currently Co-Chair of the ASIL’s
International Criminal Law Interest Group.
1 See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Executive Plans and Authorizations to Violate International
Law, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 811, 827–28, 854–55 (2005) (including related
claims of government lawyers), addressing the Memorandum of President George W.
Bush (Feb. 7, 2002) [hereinafter Bush Feb. 7, 2002 memorandum], available in FINAL
REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL TO REVIEW DOD DETENTION OPERATIONS (Aug.
2004), Appendix C [hereinafter Final Report 2004], available at http://wid.ap.org/
documents/iraq/040824finalreport.pdf.
2 See, e.g., Bush Feb. 7, 2002 memorandum, supra note 1; Final Report 2004, supra
note 1, at 33–34; John Barry et al., The Roots of Torture, NEWSWEEK, May 24, 2004, at
30–31; Katharine Q. Seelye, In Shift, Bush Says Geneva Rules Fit Taliban Captives, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 8, 2002, at A1.
3 See, e.g., Paust, supra note 1, at 814–16, 828.
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covered by the Geneva Convention” and will continue to be denied
Geneva law protections, supposedly because al Qaeda “cannot be
considered a state party to the Geneva Convention.”4  As noted
soon thereafter, however,
The White House statement demonstrates remarkable igno-
rance of the nature and reach of treaties and customary interna-
tional law.  First, any member of al Qaeda who is a national of a
state that has ratified the relevant treaties is protected by them.
Nearly every state, including Saudi Arabia, is a signatory to these
treaties.  Second, the 1949 Geneva Conventions are part of cus-
tomary international law that is universally applicable in times of
armed conflict and, as such, protect all human beings according
to their terms.  Third, common Article 3 [of the Geneva Con-
ventions] provides nonderogable protections and due process
guarantees for every human being who is captured and, like
common Article 1, assures their application in all
circumstances.5
With respect to treaties, it was affirmed long ago by Chief Jus-
tice Jay that “every citizen is a party to them.”6  This fundamental
aspect of treaty law assures that individuals and groups (such as
members of al Qaeda) are bound by treaties that have been ad-
hered to by the state of which they are nationals.  It is why an array
of treaties addressing international crimes such as aircraft hi-
jacking, aircraft sabotage, hostage-taking, forced disappearance,
terrorism, genocide, and war crimes are binding on various individ-
4 See Seelye, supra note 2.  President Bush’s memorandum stated that he accepted
“the legal conclusion of the Department of Justice” “dated January 22, 2002,” and
determined “that none of the provisions of Geneva apply to our conflict with al Qaeda
. . . because, among other reasons, al Qaeda is not a High Contracting Party.”  Bush
Feb. 7, 2002 memorandum, supra note 1, at para. 2(a).  The memorandum sent on
January 22 was most likely the thirty-seven-page Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonza-
les, Counsel to the President, and William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel of the Dep’t of
Def., Re: Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Jan.
22, 2002), prepared by Jay S. Bybee, Ass’t Att’y Gen., available at http://www.washing-
tonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/012202bybee.pdf [hereinafter Application
of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees]. See, e.g., Timeline of Memos
on Treatment of Prisoners, MIAMI HERALD, June 23, 2004, at 15.  The Application of Trea-
ties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees was basically a reiteration of the
infamous Yoo–Delahunty memorandum of January 9, 2002, addressed in Paust, supra
note 1, at 830–34.  The Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban
Detainees stated: “We conclude that these treaties do not protect the members of the
al Qaeda organization, which as a non-State actor cannot be a party to the interna-
tional agreements governing war.”  Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and
Taliban Detainees at 1; see also id. at 9.
5 Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: Courting Illegality, 23 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 1, 7–8 n.15 (2001).
6 Henfield’s Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1101, No. 6360 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793).
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uals and groups that could not and have never “ratified” such trea-
ties.  It is also why insurgents are bound by and can be prosecuted
for violations of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.
The Executive’s false claim was necessarily laid to rest by the Su-
preme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld7 when the Court ruled that
“there is at least one provision of the Geneva Conventions that ap-
plies here . . . Common Article 3.”8  Justice Kennedy added: “the
requirement of the Geneva Conventions . . . [is] a requirement
that controls here . . . The Court is correct to concentrate on one
provision of the law of war that is applicable to our Nation’s armed
conflict with al Qaeda in Afghanistan . . . That provision is Com-
mon Article 3 . . . The provision is part of a treaty the United States
has ratified and thus accepted as binding law . . . By Act of Con-
gress, moreover, violations of Common Article 3 are considered
‘war crimes,’ punishable as federal offenses.”9
Regarding presidential authorizations, it has been reported
that “current and former CIA officers . . . [stated that] there is a
presidential finding, signed in 2002, by President Bush, Con-
doleezza Rice and then-Attorney General John Ashcroft approving
. . . [unlawful interrogation] techniques, including water board-
ing.”10  It has also been reported that President Bush authorized
the CIA to secretly detain and interrogate persons in a September
17, 2001 directive known as a memorandum of notification and
that harsh interrogation tactics were devised in late 2001 and early
2002.11  Subsequently, the CIA disclosed the existence of a direc-
tive signed by President Bush granting the CIA power to set up
secret detention facilities in foreign territory and outlining interro-
gation tactics that were authorized as well as another document
that contains a Department of Justice legal analysis specifying inter-
rogation methods that the CIA was authorized to use against top al
7 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
8 Id. at 2756–57.
9 Id. at 2802 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).
10 History of an Interrogation Technique: Water Boarding, ABC NEWS, Nov. 29, 2005,
http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/print?id=1356870. See also Jonathan S. Landay, Cheney:
Water Torture is OK, Confirms Method Used on al Qaeda, THE NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
NC), Oct. 26, 2006, at A4; Paust, supra note 1, at 836–37 & n.96 (secret authorization
for the CIA), 848 n.138.  This paragraph is borrowed from Jordan J. Paust, Above the
Law: Unlawful Executive Authorizations Regarding Detainee Treatment, Secret Renditions, Do-
mestic Spying, and Claims to Unchecked Executive Power, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 345, 354
(2007) [hereinafter Above the Law], and JORDAN J. PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW: THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION’S UNLAWFUL RESPONSES IN THE “WAR” ON TERROR (2007).
11 See David Johnson & Douglas Jehl, At a Secret Interrogation, Dispute Flared over Tac-
tics, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2006, at A1. See also infra notes 12–13, 19–31.
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Qaeda members.12  There is no indication that the presidential
finding or directive has been withdrawn.  In fact, during a speech
on September 6, 2006, President Bush admitted that a CIA pro-
gram has been implemented “to move . . . [high-value] individuals
to . . . where they can be held in secret” and interrogated using
“tough” forms of treatment and he stated that the CIA program
will continue.13
The unlawful “tough” interrogation tactics that are an admit-
ted part of the Bush program are war crimes.14  They are also viola-
tions of non-derogable customary and treaty-based human rights
law15 and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhu-
man or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.16  The transfer of
non-prisoners-of-war out of war-related occupied territory in Af-
ghanistan and Iraq during the Bush program was also a war crime.
Such transfers are absolutely prohibited under Article 49 of the
Geneva Civilian Convention and constitute “grave breaches” of the
Convention.17  Moreover, the refusal to disclose the names or the
whereabouts of persons subjected to secret transfer and secret de-
tention is a manifest and serious crime against humanity known as
“forced disappearance”—a crime that also involves patent viola-
tions of related human rights law, the Convention Against Torture,
and the laws of war.18
12 See, e.g., Dan Eggen, CIA Acknowledges 2 Interrogation Memos, WASH. POST, Nov. 14,
2006, at A29; David Johnston, CIA Tells of Bush Directive on Handling of Detainees, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2006, at A14. See also Scott Shane, David Johnston & James Risen,
Secret U.S. Endorsement of Severe Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2007, at A1.
13 See, e.g., Julian E. Barnes, CIA Can Still Get Tough on Detainees, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 8,
2006, at A1; John Donnelly & Rick Klein, Bush Admits to CIA Jails; Top Suspects Are
Relocated, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 7, 2006, at A1; Ken Herman, Bush Confirms Secret Pris-
ons, Denies Torture, ATLANTA J. CONST., Sept. 7, 2006, at A1 (adding that the CIA secret
detention program “had held about 100 detainees”); Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror
Suspects in Secret Prisons, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2005, at A1; Mark Silva et al., Bush Con-
firms Use of CIA Secret Prisons, CHICAGO TRIB., Sept. 7, 2006, at 1. See also Eggen, supra
note 12; Johnston, supra note 12; Paust, supra note 1, at 836–37 & n.96.
14 See generally Paust, supra note 1, at 838–48.
15 See id. at 820–23, 845–46.  The United Nations Charter mandates that member
states take joint and separate action to ensure “universal respect for and observance of
human rights.”  U.N. Charter art. 55(c), 56.
16 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (Dec. 10, 1984). See Paust, supra note 1, at 823, 846.
17 See, e.g., Paust, supra note 1, at 850–51.
18 Concerning the Bush administration’s approval of the secret rendition of per-
sons from Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere to other countries in violation of the 1949
Geneva Conventions, the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, customary prohibitions of forced disappear-
ance, and other customary and treaty-based international law, see, e.g., Jose E. Alvarez,
Torturing the Law, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 175, 199, 210–11, 213 (2006); M. Cherif
Bassiouni, The Institutionalization of Torture Under the Bush Administration, 37 CASE W.
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John Yoo, a former Deputy Assistant Attorney General, has ad-
mitted that “some of the worst possible interrogation methods
we’ve heard of in the press have been reserved for the leaders of al
Qaeda that we’ve captured”19 and, with remarkable candor and
abandonment, “I’ve defended the administration’s legal approach
to the treatment of al Qaida suspects and detainees,” including the
use of torture.20  More recently, John Yoo has provided an honest,
remorseless, and revealing set of admissions concerning inner-cir-
RES. J. INT’L L. 389, 411–13 (2006); Paust, supra note 1, at 836–37 & n.96, 850–51 &
nn.147–51; Jordan J. Paust, Post 9/11 Overreaction and Fallacies Regarding War and De-
fense, Guantánamo, the Status of Persons, Treatment, Judicial Review of Detention, and Due
Process in Military Commissions, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1335, 1352–56 (2004); Leila
Nadya Sadat, Ghost Prisoners and Black Sites: Extraordinary Rendition Under International
Law, 57 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 309 (2006); Leila Zerrougui et al., Report, Situation of
Detainees at Guantánamo Bay, Commission on Human Rights, 62d sess., items 10 and
11 of the provisional agenda, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/120 (Feb. 15, 2006), at 26–27,
paras. 55, 37, 89 (“The practice of rendition of persons to countries where there is a
substantial risk of torture . . .  amounts to a violation of the principle of non-refoule-
ment and is contrary to Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture and Article 7 of
the ICCPR”), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/16_02_06_
un_guantanamo.pdf; Eur. Parl. Ass., resol. 1433, Lawfulness of Detentions by the
United States in Guantánamo Bay, paras. 7(vi) (“the unlawful practice of secret deten-
tion”), (vii) (“[T]he United States has, by practicing ‘rendition’ (removal of persons
to other countries, without judicial supervision, for purposes such as interrogation or
detention), allowed detainees to be subjected to torture and cruel, inhuman or de-
grading treatment, in violation of the prohibition of non-refoulement”), 8(vii), (ix)
(Apr. 26, 2005), available at http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?Link=/documents/
adoptedtext/ta05eres1433.htm; Diane Marie Amann, The Committee Against Torture
Urges an End to Guantánamo Detention, ASIL Insight (June 8, 2006), available at http://
www.asil.org/insights/2006/06/insights060608.html; Christine Spolar, Ex-Spy: CIA,
Italians Worked on Abduction; Arrest Warrant Targets 4 Accused Americans, CHI. TRIB., July
9, 2006, at 10; Craig Whitlock, Germans Charge 13 CIA Operatives, WASH. POST, Feb. 1,
2007, at A1. See also Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 7(2)(i), U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (July 17, 1998), 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, available at http://www.un.
org/law/icc/statute/english/rome_statute(e).pdf, (forced disappearance is a cus-
tomary crime against humanity); Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance, G.A. Res. 47/133, 92d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/RES/47/133,
(Dec. 18, 1992), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 903 (1993); RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702(c), cmt. n & R. 1 (1987); Inter-American
Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, pmbl. & art. II, June 9, 1994, re-
printed in 33 I.L.M. 1529 (1994).
19 John Yoo, Remarks on National Public Radio (Dec. 15, 2005). See also JOHN
YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS 190–91 (2006); text supra note 13 (Bush admits that
“tough” tactics were used against “high-value” detainees held in secret detention by
the CIA).  This paragraph is borrowed from Paust, Above the Law, supra note 10, at
357–58.
20 John Yoo, President’s Power in Times of War, TRIBUNE–REVIEW (Greensburg, Pa.),
Dec. 25, 2005. See also Paust, supra note 1, at 830–33, 834–35 n.89, 842–43, 856 &
n.172, 858, 861–62 & n.198 (discussing the role that Yoo played); David Klaidman et
al., Palace Revolt, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 6, 2006, at 34 (the infamous 2002 Bybee torture
memorandum was “drafted by Yoo” and a “Yoo memo in March 2003 was even more
expansive, authorizing military interrogators . . . to ignore many criminal statutes”);
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cle decisions of the Bush administration to violate Geneva law.  As
he discloses, detention, denial of Geneva protections, and coercive
interrogation “policies were part of a common, unifying approach
to the war on terrorism.”21  Instead of “following the Geneva Con-
ventions,” during meetings chaired by White House Counsel Gon-
zales22 the inner-circle decided whether such “would yield any
benefits or act as a hindrance.”23  They knew that following Geneva
law would “interfere with our ability to . . . interrogate,”24 since
“Geneva bars ‘any form of coercion.’”25  For the inner-circle,
“[t]his became the central issue,”26 and following “‘Geneva’s strict
limitations on . . . questioning’” “made no sense.”27  They calcu-
lated that “treating the detainees as unlawful combatants would in-
crease flexibility in detention and interrogation”28 and the
question became merely “what interrogation methods fell short of
the torture ban and could be used”29 as “coercive interrogation,”30
Chitra Ragavan, Cheney’s Guy, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, May 29, 2006, at 32 (Yoo
was a drafter, with Addington and Bybee, of the Bybee torture memorandum).
21 YOO, supra note 19, at ix.
22 See id. at 30 (in December 2001 and for months thereafter Gonzales chaired the
meetings “to develop [such] policy”), which is torture and a war crime. See infra notes
43–44 and accompanying text.  Concerning the chairing of meetings by Gonzales and
his abetment of denials of Geneva law rights and protections, which are violations of
the Conventions and war crimes, see also Paust, supra note 1, at 824–26, 830, 834 n.89,
848 n.138; Eric Lichtblau, Gonzales Says Humane-Policy Order Doesn’t Bind C.I.A., N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 19, 2005, at A17; Evan Thomas & Michael Hirsh, The Debate over Torture,
NEWSWEEK, Nov. 21, 2005, at 26; Editorial, WASH. POST, Apr. 26, 2005, at A14 (Gonza-
les meeting approved simulated drowning).
23 YOO, supra note 19, at 35.
24 Id. at 39.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 39–40.
28 Id. at 43.
29 Id. at 171. See also id. at ix (by focusing “on what constituted ‘torture’ under the
law . . . our agents [supposedly, but erroneously] would know exactly what was prohib-
ited, and what was not.”), 172 (“OLC addressed this question: What is the meaning of
‘torture’”).  This is an example of manifestly and seriously unprofessional advice, leav-
ing unstated, for example, the ban under several treaties of the United States and
customary international law of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment.  It has led
to possible criminal and civil liability here and abroad for CIA personnel and U.S.
soldiers. See, e.g., supra note 18; infra note 45.
30 See id. at 172 (“harsh interrogation short of torture”), 177 (“Congress banned
torture, but not interrogation techniques short of it . . . coercive interrogation” is
permitted), 178 (“[m]ethods that . . . do not cause severe pain or suffering are per-
mitted.”), 187 (“American law prohibits torture but not coercive interrogation,” such
as “using ‘excruciating pain’”), 190–91 (coercive interrogation was used), 192 (“coer-
cive interrogation . . . should not be ruled out”), 202 (same).
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which includes cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment.31  In
view of the fact that a “common, unifying approach” was devised to
use coercive interrogation tactics and President Bush has admitted
that such tactics and secret detention have been used in other
countries, it is obvious that coercive interrogation tactics migrated
also to Afghanistan and Iraq as part of the common plan.32  It is
also clear, for example, that the Yoo–Delahunty,33 Gonzales,34 Ash-
croft,35 Bybee,36 and Goldsmith37 memos and letters, the 2003
DOD Working Group Report,38 and presidential and other autho-
rizations, directives, and findings substantially facilitated the effec-
tuation of the common, unifying plan to use coercive interrogation
and that use of authorized coercive interrogation tactics were ei-
ther known or substantially foreseeable consequences.
Implementation of the common plan apparently occurred
first at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.  It is well-known that Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld had expressly authorized patently un-
lawful interrogation tactics involving the stripping of persons na-
ked, use of dogs, and hooding, among other unlawful tactics, in an
action memo on December 2, 200239 and in another memo on
April 16, 2003,40 the Secretary adding that if additional interroga-
tion techniques for a particular detainee were required he might
approve them upon written request.41
CIA Director Porter Goss has admitted that prior Agency tech-
niques for interrogation have been restricted under the McCain
Amendment to the 2005 Detainee Treatment Act, which reiterated
the prohibition of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment.42
31 Id. at 200.  That such tactics were authorized for use in Iraq, see, e.g., Paust, supra
note 1, at 843, 847 & n.135, 848–50.
32 See also Paust, Above the Law, supra note 10, at 359; Paust, supra note 1, at 846–50.
33 See Paust, supra note 1, at 830–33.
34 See id. at 824–26, 830.
35 See id. at 827.
36 See id. at 834–36.
37 See id. at 850–51.
38 See id. at 841.
39 Paust, supra note 1, at 840–41.
40 Id. at 843–44 & nn.120, 122. See also Jane Mayer, The Memo: How an Internal Effort
to Ban the Abuse and Torture of Detainees Was Thwarted, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 27, 2006,
available at http://www.newyorker.com/images/pdfs/moramemo.pdf (addressing a
memorandum from General Counsel of the Navy Alberto J. Mora to Inspector Gen-
eral, Dep’t of Navy, Vice Admiral Albert Church, Statement for the Record: Office of
General Counsel Involvement in Interrogation Issues, July 7, 2004).
41 Paust, supra note 1, at 843–44.
42 See YOO, supra note 19, at 171 (under the Bush policy, “methods . . . short of the
torture ban . . . could be used”), 178 (the Bush policy had been that “[m]ethods that
. . . do not cause severe pain or suffering are permitted”), 187 (“using ‘excruciating
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Some CIA personnel have reported that approved Agency tech-
niques include “striking detainees in an effort to cause pain and
fear,” “the ‘cold cell’ . . . [where d]etainees are held naked in a cell
cooled to 50 degrees and periodically doused with cold water,” and
“‘water boarding’ . . . [which produces] a terrifying fear of drown-
ing,”43 each of which is manifestly illegal under the laws of war and
human rights law44 and can result in criminal and civil sanctions
for war crimes.45
Are the President, the Vice President,46 the Attorney General,
and others within the executive branch above the law?  Clearly they
are not, despite an arrogant and fundamentally anti-democratic
commander-above-the-law policy that seeks an unreviewable power
pain’” related to “coercive interrogation” not prohibited by the executive), 190–91
(stating “coercive interrogation” was used), 200 (“If the text of the McCain Amend-
ment were to be enforced as is, we could not coercively interrogate.”); R. Jeffrey
Smith, Fired Officer Believed CIA Lied to Congress, WASH. POST, May 14, 2006, at A1 (stat-
ing that there is a “secret Justice Department opinion in 2004 authorizing the
agency’s creation of ‘ghost detainees’—prisoners removed from Iraq for secret inter-
rogations” in violation of Geneva law and CIA officer and former director of intelli-
gence programs of the National Security Agency, Mary O. McCarthy, has stated that
CIA policies authorized treatment she “considered cruel, inhumane or degrading.”);
Toni Locy & John Diamond, Memo Lists Acceptable “Aggressive” Interrogation Methods,
U.S.A. TODAY, June 27, 2004, at A5 (stating that a secret DOJ August 2002 memoran-
dum apparently exists that is more detailed than the 2002 Bybee torture memoran-
dum and it “spelled out specific interrogation methods that the CIA” can use,
including “water boarding”); Mayer, supra note 40 (the memorandum allows inhu-
mane treatment of persons held by the C.I.A.); Eric Schmitt & Carolyn Marshall, In
Secret Unit’s “Black Room,” a Grim Portrait of U.S. Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2006, at A1
(asserting secret sites in Camp Nama near Baghdad and elsewhere in Iraq were used
for harsh interrogation by CIA, military, and others and tactics included use of the
cold cell).  This paragraph is borrowed from Paust, Above the Law, supra note 10, at
352.
43 See, e.g., Editorial, Director for Torture, WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 2005, at A18. See also
Paust, supra note 1, at 836–37 n.96, 848 n.138; Douglas Jehl & David Johnston, C.I.A.
Expands Its Inquiry Into Interrogation Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2004, at A10 (there
were “some extreme tactics used at those secret [CIA] centers, including ‘water board-
ing’”); Landay, supra note 10; Interview of the Vice President by Scott Hennen, WDAY
at Radio Day at the White House, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/
10/20061024-7.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2007).
44 See, e.g., Paust, supra note 1, at 836 n.96, 846 (“using cold air to chill”); In re
Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 910 F. Supp. 1460, 1463 (D.
Haw. 1995) (“forms of torture” include “[t]he ‘water cure,’ where a cloth was placed
over the detainee’s mouth and nose, and water poured over it producing a drowning
sensation” and “[f]orcing a detainee while wet and naked to sit before an air condi-
tioner often while sitting on a block of ice,” among other interrogation tactics).
45 See, e.g., Paust, supra note 1, at 852–54.
46 Concerning the role played by Cheney, see, e.g., id. at 837–38 & n.97; Paust,
Above the Law, supra note 10, at 350–52, 396–97, 399 n.142. See also Landay, supra note
10.
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to override any inhibiting domestic or international law.47  Under
the United States Constitution, the President is expressly and un-
avoidably bound to faithfully execute the law and has been granted
no discretion to violate the law.48  Three sets of numerous and
venerable Supreme Court and lower federal court decisions con-
firm that the President, as Commander in Chief, is not above the
law.  One consistent and unswerving set of cases reflects the unani-
mous views of the Founders and Framers that, during war, the Pres-
ident and all persons within the executive branch are bound by the
laws of war, whether or not those laws are based in treaties of the
United States or customary international law.49
A second set of cases provides overwhelming recognition that
decisions of the Executive during war concerning the status of per-
sons, their seizure and detention, their rights, their treatment, and
the seizure of property are judicially reviewable and that the judici-
ary, despite provisional characterizations by the executive, will
identify, clarify, and apply relevant customary and treaty-based in-
ternational law.50  A remarkable Supreme Court case that is found
in the first and second set of cases is The Paquete Habana.51  Al-
though the case is too often needlessly misunderstood and mis-
quoted, the Supreme Court denied a claim of the executive
concerning the content of a customary law of war and ruled that
executive seizures of enemy alien vessels and enemy aliens abroad
in time of war in exercise of executive war powers in the theater of
war were void because they were in violation of customary interna-
tional law which is part of the laws of the United States that must
be ascertained and applied by the judiciary.52
A third set of cases provides recognition that Congress has
47 See, e.g., Paust, Above the Law, supra note 10, at 393–99.
48 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
49 See, e.g., Paust, supra note 1, at 856–61; Jordan J. Paust, International Law Before
the Supreme Court: A Mixed Record of Recognition, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 829, 839–40
n.53 (2005).
50 See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Judicial Power to Determine the Status and Rights of Persons
Detained Without Trial, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 503, 517–24 (2003).
51 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
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constitutionally-based power to place limits on certain commander
in chief powers during war, including limitations on warfare with
respect to its extent, objects, operations, methods, persons and
things affected, places, and time.53  More generally, the Supreme
Court has also recognized that the President’s foreign relations
power can “be regulated by treaty or by act of Congress . . . and [if
regulated thusly, must] be executed by the executive” in accor-
dance with the treaty or legislative limitations.54
During war and threats to national security, it is often the judi-
ciary that has maintained the line between lawful and unlawful ex-
ercises of power, a line that the Supreme Court has maintained
more recently in Rasul,55 Hamdi,56 and Hamdan.57  For example, in
the face of executive claims to unreviewable commander in chief
powers, the Supreme Court affirmed in Hamdi that courts can “ex-
ercise their own time-honored and constitutionally mandated roles
of reviewing and resolving claims”58 and quoted Sterling v. Constan-
tin59 for its earlier recognition that “‘[w]hat are the allowable limits
of military discretion, and whether or not they have been over-
stepped in a particular case, are judicial questions.’”60 Hamdi also
affirmed that executive claims to unreviewable power or to power
subject only to “a heavily circumscribed role for the courts” cannot
comport with the proper separation of powers since it “serves only
to condense power into a single branch of government,” adding “a
state of war is not a blank check for the President.”61
Finally, the President’s “dirty war” tactics and autocratic poli-
cies have not only created criminal and civil liability, they have also
served our enemies and degraded this country, its values, and its
influence.  As patriots of democratic freedom understand, they
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59 287 U.S. 378 (1932).
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threaten our democracy and the rule of law.  It is time to end im-
punity.  It is time for a change.

